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Diverse radio spectrum management regimes are defined according to 4 levels 
of questions:  
-  Should frequencies be allocated according to a harmonised plan? 
-  Should the technologies allowed be standardised? 
-  Should spectrum usage rights be exclusive, eased, or collective? 
-  Should  usage  rights  be  assigned  through  market  mechanisms, 
administrative procedures, or hybrid procedures? 
This paper establishes a balanced set of decision criteria for each question. It 
describes nine regimes resulting from the  combined answers. The taxonomy 
illustrates the possible rationales for a diversity of regimes broader than the 
usually  exposed  standard  trilogy  of  Command  and  Control,  Market  and 
Commons:  This  includes  Harmonised  flexibility,  Administered  flexibility, 
Technology flexibility in Command and Control context, Harmonised flexibility 
Plus, Private Commons and California Dream. The nine regimes can also be 
considered  as  a  map  with  which  to  navigate  in  order  to  accommodate 
institutional and technological transitions. This allows decision-makers to come-
up  with  informed  choices  using  all  the  technical  information  available,  and 
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Wireless  services  will  undergo  a  major  expansion  in  the  next  decade.  The 
generally accepted view is that this will provoke an increased need for radio 
spectrum. Major technological changes are under way as well, which might help 
in improving its efficient use, but also warrant savvier management methods.
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The  debate  on  adequate,  future-oriented,  spectrum  management  is  currently 
reaching  a  critical  point.  A  trend  towards  flexibility  in  the  form  of  market 
mechanisms (auctions of spectrum property rights and trading) was initiated in 
New Zealand, then the U.S. in 1993, and expanded in a number of European and 
Asian countries as of 2000. It was consistently formalised in 2002 by the FCC 
Spectrum Task Force Report in the U.S.
2 and the Martin Cave Report in the 
UK
3.  The  two  reports
4  translated  into  a  comprehensive,  market-oriented 
spectrum management framework that has served as an underlying reference to 
subsequent policy initiatives in Europe since this time. 
 
It seems, however, that this trend is encountering delays where it is already 
implemented or favourably considered, and facing fierce opposition in territories 
it has not conquered. It might consequently be useful to sort out the alternatives, 
list  the  arguments  exchanged,  look  into  the  prospects  offered  by  ongoing 
technological  developments  in  wireless,  and  pave  the  way  for  possible 
transitions paths.  
 
This paper proposes to: 
                                                   
1 This paper has strongly benefited from the research being carried out within the European 
Commission  Specific  Support  Action  SPORT  VIEWS  (Spectrum  Policies  and  Radio 
Technologies  for  Viable  Wireless  Services,  Contract  No  027297).  Comments  and 
contributions have been received from Frédéric Pujol, Marvin Sirbu and anonymous referees. 
However, the author carries sole responsibility for the views expressed in this article. They do 
not in particular necessarily reflect those of the European Commission or the SPORT VIEWS 
consortium partners. 
2 Federal Communications Commission Spectrum Policy Task Force Report, November 2002 
http://www.fcc.gov/sptf/ 
 
3 Review of  Radio Spectrum Management,  An Independent review for the Department of 
Trade and Industry and HM Treasury, By Professor Martin Cave, March 2002 
http://www.spectrumreview.radio.gov.uk/ 
 
4 For an overview of spectrum management methods and the international experience: J. Scott 
Marcus,  L.  Nett,  M.  Scanlan,  U.  Stumpf,  M.  Cave,  G.  Pogorel,  Towards  more  flexible 





































-  Explore the whole range of choices available to regulators and industry in 
establishing a radio spectrum management policy by expanding beyond 
the standard trilogy of Command and Control, Market and Commons. 
-  Organise and clarify the expanded set of alternatives to be considered. 
-  List  the  criteria  whereby  the  necessary  choices  and  decisions  can  be 
made. 
 
1.  Definitions: Four dimensions of spectrum management  
 
A  spectrum  management  regime  comprises  four  dimensions  that  have  to  be 
successively  analysed.
5  The  concepts  and  alternative  approaches  must  be 
explored at the following levels: 
 
•  Allocation: service harmonisation or service flexibility  
•  Technology: standardisation or technology flexibility 
•  Usage rights definition: alternative regimes 
•  Assignment modes of spectrum usage rights  
 
We will successively examine the above issues and alternatives. 
 
 
1.1.  Allocation of frequencies: Service harmonisation or service flexibility? 
 
Harmonisation is intended as allocating a frequency band or set of frequency 
bands for a service application or category of services. It consists in defining 
measures at international (ITU), regional (Europe, America, Asia), and national 
levels and poses limitations on service flexibility. 
 
Harmonisation does not have to be implemented all over the spectrum. There 
can be harmonised bands where justified, and non-harmonised bands elsewhere 
in the spectrum. This translates into an opposition between no harmonisation all 
across the spectrum (or commercial spectrum) and harmonisation for distinct 
wireless services sets (“clusters”). 
 
 
                                                   
5Johannes  M.  Bauer,  A  Comparative  Analysis  of  Spectrum  Management  Regimes,  Quello 






































1.2.  Technology: Standardisation or technology flexibility 
 
Standardisation is intended as designating a technology or set of technologies to 
provide a category of service. It aims to ensure that the equipment used meets 
the  technical  requirements  specified  in  technical  product  standards,  or 
specifications,  in  order  to  provide  market  advantage  in  terms  of  better 
coexistence or interoperability, cross-border roaming, economies of scale, etc. 
Standards  can  be  determined  by  public  bodies  such  as  ETSI,  or  the  market 
(industry-led),  and  then  mandated  by  regulation  or  not.  It  is  assumed  that 
standardisation can only reasonably occur in a harmonised context. 
 
For  reasons  of  clarity,  it  is  important  to  draw  this  distinction  between 
harmonisation  and  standardisation.  Harmonisation  of  frequency  bands,  is  an 
option at frequency allocation level, standardisation takes place at technology 
level. There can be harmonisation with, or without, standardisation. There are 
obvious relationships between the two, as technical standards have to cope with 
the physical qualities of frequencies. Yet harmonisation and standardisation do 
not  necessarily  go  hand  in  hand.  Various  technical  standards,  or  even  non-
standardised technologies, can possibly be used in harmonised bands. Although 





1.3.  Usage rights definition 
 
In the spectrum context, the following categories of usage rights can be defined: 
 
Property rights have been widely heralded as a major factor of economic and 
social dynamic evolution. There can be: 
-  Exclusive property rights (without easements) 
-  Property rights with easements: they make provisions for sharing, overlay, 
underlay, and Dynamic Frequency Selection (DFS). DFS can be intended in 
a  restrictive  sense  as  the  possibility  of  shifting  between  a  set  of 
predetermined harmonised bands, or, more extensively, as the possibility of 
shifting across large areas of the spectrum. It is compatible with all non-
exclusive property based regimes. The SPORT VIEWS project has examined 
the potential interest of introducing reasoned easements. This perspective of 
                                                   





































disaggregating property rights to benefit from technology evolution has been 
extensively explored by Martin Cave
7. 
 
Collective use, the third type of usage rights, became popular as “commons” in 
the late nineties with the advent of WiFi and was promoted as a far-reaching, 
future-oriented model. The possible extent of collective use, and conversely, of 




1.4.  Assignment modes of spectrum usage rights  
 
There are two main categories of usage right assignment modes: 
 
•  Comparative administrative procedures, which include: 
o  Pure administrative procedures. 
o  Hybrid modes, such as  administrative procedures with a bidding 
price  as  part  of  a  weighted  multi-criterion  formula.  They  put 
together  the  contribution  to  local  and  regional  broadband 
development and a financial element.
9 There is a price component, 
but the licence remains under administrative control. 
o  Administered  incentive  pricing,  which  also  remains  within  the 
category of administrative control. 
 
•  Auctions  resulting  in  exclusive  property  rights,  which  represent  the 
quintessential  market  solution  for  the  assignment  of  spectrum  usage 
rights. Trading is a complement to this approach for secondary markets. 
 
Assignment modes have been the subject of numerous studies.
10 
The  table  below  summarises  the  overall  alternatives  arranged  in  a  4-step 
decision tree designing nine spectrum management regimes: 
                                                   
7 Cave M., New spectrum-using  technologies  and  the future of spectrum  management:  a 
European policy perspective, OFCOM May 2006. 
8  Legal,  economic  and  technical  aspects  of  collective  use  of  spectrum  in  the  European 
Community, Final Report by Mott MacDonald Ltd, Aegis Systems Limited, IDATE, Indepen 
Ltd and Wik Consult 
9 ARCEP (France)  3,5 GHz WLL Wimax Assignnment, July 2006 
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The standard trilogy is present in this table. We recognise regime 1a as the 
traditional Command and Control model. Regime 7b qualifies as a full property-
based market regime: one single market process combining flexible frequency 
allocation and technical choice. Regime 6 is the “commons” model. 
 
What  this  table  illustrates,  however,  is  a  diversity  of  regimes  broader  that 
usually  exposed.  Before  looking  into  the  grounds  on  which  each  of  these 
regimes could be pragmatically justified, let us provide some brief descriptions. 
Regime  1b,  for  instance,  combines  a  hybrid  of  command  and  control  at  a 
frequency  allocation  and  technology  level,  and  auctions  for  property  rights 
assignment. Harmonisation (at allocation level) is thus compatible with some 
degree of market mechanisms, at assignment level, as seen in the UMTS case in 
Europe. This represents some kind of limited flexibility: sticking to harmonised 
allocation at an upper level, with market at assignment level. It could be said to 
fall into a category of “harmonised flexibility.” 
 
Hybridisation  can  also  occur  between  comparative  administrative  procedures 
and auctions, as in regime 4a Technology flexibility in Command and Control 
context exemplified by the 2006 “Wimax” authorisation procedure in France. It 
combined qualitative elements submitted to administrative evaluation, like the 
contribution  to  regional  development,  with  financial  bids.  It  can  also  be 
presented as auctions with room for negotiations and mediation by the regulator. 
As the regulator retains the upper hand in the mix of criteria, we consider it to 
fall, as a variant, into the administrative procedures category, rather than the 
auctions category. 
 
Regime 5b Harmonised flexibility Plus seems like an interesting combination of 
harmonised frequencies, technical flexibility, and easements on property rights 
acquired through auctions, thus accommodating some of operators’ preferences, 
as well as possibilities of sharing and dynamic frequency selection. 
 
Not all regimes are representative of realistic alternatives, but homage should be 
paid to regime 9 California Dream, which embodies the vision of a vast radio 
spectrum commons, supposing that the technologies exist to support it. 
 
We have shown that flexibility and efficiency in spectrum management has to 
be considered at various levels and can be combined in a variety of ways. Let us 
now expose the iteration of pragmatic considerations at four successive levels of 






































2.  Deciding on spectrum management regimes: The 4-step decision 
process 
 
Efficiency is often quoted in relation to flexibility. We can refer to the ERO 80 
Report definition of flexibility
11 as: 
“Increasing the ability of the spectrum regulatory framework to facilitate and 
adapt, in a timely manner, to user requirements and technological innovation by 
reducing constraints on the use of spectrum and barriers to access spectrum.” 
 
We  can  see  that  flexibility  is  easily  accommodated  within  the  proposed 
analytical  taxonomy,  as  it  takes  place  at  all  four  decision  levels:  frequency 
allocation, technology, usage rights, and assignment procedure. We now have 
the possibility to look at spectrum efficiency against this comprehensive and 
articulated framework to gain a better understanding of what is at stake in the 
present debate. 
 
Let us look at the criteria decision-makers can resort to when going through the 
four steps constitutive of spectrum policy choices. 
 
On the two issues of harmonisation and standardisation, it is to be noted the 
existing literature provides neither positive nor negative compelling evidence on 
their  overall  necessity  and  superiority  to  non-harmonisation  and  non-
standardisation.  Moreover,  the  existing  literature  does  not  provide  either  a 
locally applicable toolbox of criteria to make easily the proper choices. The 
evidence itself is not yet conclusive. For instance, in the very popular area of 
mobile communications  services, the jury is still out on the outcome of the 
confrontation between the GSM-UMTS standardisation line of action in Europe 
and the agnostic approach adopted by the U.S. and Korea. 
 
Industry associations, however, at least in Europe, have taken a contrarian view 
on service and technology flexibility in mobile services, and emphasised the 
benefits of harmonisation and standardisation in two recent studies (GSMA and 
UMTS Forum, 2006). 
 
From  this  perspective,  the  critical  questions  to  be  answered  when  making 
choices  of  harmonisation  versus  non-harmonisation,  and  of  standardisation 
versus non-standardisation, consist in the practical, future-oriented evaluation of 
two categories of factors. In short, the general trade-offs in matters of spectrum 
harmonisation and wireless technology standardisation are as follows. 
                                                   
11 CEPT-ERO Report 80: Enhancing harmonisation and increasing Flexibility in Spectrum 







































2.1.  Step 1: Harmonisation? 
 
Harmonisation  is  meant  to  minimise  interferences,  reduce  cross-border 
coordination  requirements  and  ensure  roaming  facilities.  The  benefits  for 
consumers result from the lower network planning expenses and lower prices of 
devices. The costs of harmonisation are the inefficiency costs incurred from 
local or overall suboptimal usage of the spectrum resource, administrative costs 
and slower innovation. 
 
It then can be said: 
 
Lemma 1: Harmonisation costs and benefits 
If the cost differential induced at network gear and device levels by lack of 
harmonisation is low, economies of scale apply to the whole industry, even in a 
non-harmonised  frequency  bands  regime.  If  the  differential  is  high, 
harmonisation must prevail.  
 
In other words, the question to be answered by decision-makers is: 
 
-  How much does the lack of, or only partial, harmonisation (like in the case of 
GSM  bands  in  Europe  and  the  US) impact  the  cost  of  network  equipment, 




2.2.  Step 2: Standardisation? 
 
 
It  is  generally  accepted  that  there  is  a  direct  negative  relation  between 
production  scale  and  the  costs  of  manufactured  products.  Standardisation 
leading to an increase in scale is intended to lower the costs. The argument 
against (costs of-) standardisation (government or even industry-led) is that it 
creates a lock-in, which slows or even precludes the introduction of innovative, 
unexpected and un-expectable technologies. The risk is then that the industry is 
stuck  with  inferior  technology.  At  the  highest  conceptual  level,  dynamic 
efficiency must prevail upon static considerations: innovation being by essence 
largely unpredictable, government-led standardisation would have to be avoided 





































establishment of barriers to entry. Eventually, the trade-off is between lower 
costs made possible by economies of scale on the plus side and potential barriers 
to entry for innovative new technologies on the minus side.  
 
Lemma 2: Rate of technical progress and standardisation 
If it can be safely assumed that technical progress for network equipments and 
terminals  in  a  significant  period  under  consideration  (10-15  years)  can  be 
anticipated,  or  accommodated  within  designated  standards  or  standard 
categories,  the  benefits  of  standardisation  apply.  If  too  much  uncertainty 
regarding future technologies exists, or if a careful examination of developments 
in  the  labs  leads  us  to  assume  there  is  a  risk  of  major  disruptive  changes, 
avoiding standardisation is the safe bet. Game theory or probabilities can be of 
use in the decision-making process. 
 
-  The question about standardisation is: how much is lost in terms of extra 
costs for consumers if terminals have to combine two or more standards? Is our 
grasp of the technological paradigm in wireless for the next 10-15 years strong 
enough to aim at the benefits of standardisation, or is there a risk we might miss 
valuable opportunities, like those offered for instance by sharing, collective use 
and DFS, and in what timeframe? 
 
 
2.3.  Step 3: What type of usage rights? 
 
Exclusive property rights 
 
Property rights, in the area of spectrum, are favourably described as fostering 
efficient use, allowing more players to access the resource, and, when combined 
with  trading,  introduce  an  element  of  smooth  and  efficient  flexibility  in 
accordance with economic optimality criteria. Many advocate that they must be 
exclusive (without easements), to confer the licensees the benefit of a “clean 
spectrum”, free of interferences. 
 
The costs and potential risks include the creation of entry barriers in access to 
non-replicable  resources,  fragmentation,  hoarding,  pre-emption,  market 
dominance, foreclosure of new entrants, in a context of vertical and horizontal 
integration, thus creating a potentially harmful situation with no remedies.  
 
Looking  at  exclusive  property  rights  assigned  through  market  mechanisms, 
whatever the harmonisation and  standardisation context, many question their 





































that strategic use and  significant market power lurk around the corner. They 
dispute the view held by the FCC and OFCOM that, should Significant Market 
Power  situations  arise,  they  could  be  dealt  with  through  standard  generic 
competition monitoring rules and procedures. They argue  exclusive property 
rights on limited resources intrinsically build up to barriers to entry and have a 
negative impact on flexibility.   
 
An interpretation of the obligations formally or informally imposed on operators 
by regulators to subcontract part of their capacity to MVNOs is precisely that 
they have had to mitigate the exclusive character of the licenses by imposing or 
inducing some kind of sharing. 
 
 
Property rights with easements 
 
The introduction of easements would be justified by recent advances in low 
power and dynamic frequency selection (DFS), also called dynamic spectrum 
access  networks  (DySpaN),  They  have  led  some  to  think  that  spectrum 
efficiency  would  be  increased  by  easements  permitting  sharing,  overlay, 




Collective use refers to access to license-exempt bands, an “etiquette” limiting, 
but not preventing interferences. 
 
-  The benefits of collective use include: 
 
- Low entry barriers 
- Quickly addressed niche applications 
- Certainty of obtaining access 
- Lower demand for licensed spectrum 
- Innovation (anti-monopoly) 
- Public infrastructure 
- Freedom of speech/cultural diversity 
- Light licensing 






































-  The  collective  use  costs  are  technical  restrictions  and  higher  risks  of 
interference. 
 
The  EU  study  on  collective  use  presents  an  up-to-date  assessment  of  the 
potential extent of this category of usage rights.
12 
 
Deciding on spectrum usage rights 
 
In deciding on the nature of spectrum usage rights, two levels of analysis have to 
be considered. The first is the relevance and institutional acceptability of the 
property-rights  framework  in  the  radio  frequency  spectrum  area.  It  actually 
confronts decisions-makers with difficult social and political choices, very much 
related  to  the  general  institutional  setting  and  mood  in  each  country:  the 
extension of property-rights meets less resistance in the UK and U.S. than in 
other  countries.  A  second  level  of  analysis  rests  at  the  technology  level:  it 
concerns the reality and feasibility of the technologies justifying easements in 
the property rights category, and of collective use. If we generically call those 
“flexible technologies”, we can envisage two simple scenarios: 
- Scenario 1: “flexible technologies” work 
- Scenario 2: “flexible technologies” don’t work. 
We then have two strategies:  
-  Allow  for  the  possible  advent  and  significant  extension  of  “flexible 
technologies”, and then either derive the greatest possible benefits if they 
work - or be left with an awkward and inefficient regulation framework if 
they don’t.  
-  Stick to what we know best: property rights, and then be right if “flexible 
technologies” don’t work, or miss a significant opportunity if they do. 
 
Those scenarios, strategies and outcomes are  summarised in the simple table 
below:   
 
                                                   
12  Study  on  Legal,  economic  and  technical  aspects  of  collective  use  of  spectrum  in  the 
European Community by Mott MacDonald Ltd, Aegis Systems Limited, IDATE, Indepen Ltd 






































Strategies &  scenarios 












No  significant  difference  In 





























The assumptions made here are that: 
-  Sticking to exclusive property rights if flexible technologies are feasible 
leads to an inferior outcome in terms of consumer welfare. 
-  Flexible technologies are better accommodated by a regime-mix strategy 
that would include easements and collective use. 
 
Decision  theory  illustrates  how  choices  to  be  made  under  those  conditions 
depend on the applied methodologies and the values of variables.  
 
-  If scenarios can be assigned probabilities, the outcome will depend on them. 
No  objective  probability  being  available,  the  exercise  consisting  in 
subjectively  assigning  probabilities  to  the  scenarios,  based  on  our  “best 
knowledge” can significantly enlighten the decision process. Basically, if the 
“Advent of flexible technologies scenario” is considered the most probable, 





































improbable, “Exclusive Property Rights Strategy” wins, unless the relative 
value of the “High consumer welfare” is very high. 
 
-  Alternatively, a very basic game-theoretic approach provides the following 
outcomes: 
 
Posture  Criterion  Preferred Strategy  
Aiming  at  the  best 
(HIGH), but most risky, 
outcome 




Avoiding  the  worst 
outcome (LOW): 
Minimax:  minimum  of 
maximum outcomes) 
Exclusive property rights 
Choice 
Intermediate  Minimax  regret: 
minimum  of  maximum 
regret  (regret  being 
intended  as  the 
difference  between  the 
actual  outcome  of  a 
strategy and the outcome 
obtained  if  the  best 
strategy had been chosen 
in each scenario) 
Depending on 
quantitative values of 




2.4.  Step 4: What kind of spectrum assignment mode should be adopted? 
 
Administrative assignment procedures/hybrid procedures 
 
Regulators have made significant efforts over the last decade to keep up with 
market changes and innovations. Some contend, however, that administrative 
methods might have reached a limit and that the situation and inconsistencies in 
spectrum  management  regimes  actually  hinder  the  deployment  of  new 
technologies.  Advocates  of  administered  flexibility,  intended  as  flexibility 
achieved within an administered setting, argue that the complexity of spectrum 
usage,  namely  the  prevention  of  interferences,  demands  strong  control 
mechanisms. They add that even if it represents some costs, those are smaller 
than those induced by the multiplication of conflicts and litigations that would 
occur in their absence. There should be a trade-off between the costs induced by 
sub-optimal administrative procedures and the technical monitoring, adjustment 






































Hybrid procedures (administrative with bidding  as  a criterion among others) 
have the positive effect of combining: 
-  Welfare considerations 
-  Domestic and international security concerns 
-  Preserving national or regional champions to a certain degree 
-  Capturing rents (possibly by maintaining them?). 
 
Some governments, not all, are willing to implement this  set of criteria and 
design  their  procedures  accordingly.  Others  favour  a  more  radical  market 





Whether  market  mechanisms  in  the  form  of  auctions  and  trading  can  bring 
competition and efficiency in spectrum usage is hotly debated. Some agencies 
are optimistic that competition will take place. The pro-market line of reasoning 
taken by the FCC Task Force 2002 report and the Radio Agency Martin Cave 
2002  reports  refer  to  the  respectable  consideration  that  the  introduction  of 
market mechanisms optimises the usage of spectrum, as of any other resource. It 
would basically seem that the same holds for the policy orientations upheld by 
the European Commission: what they propose, not without merit, is an extension 
to spectrum of the general internal market principles, which are the backbone of 
the EU economic propositions.  As for trading, it is usually thought of as a way 
either to correct initial flaws in allocation or assignment, or to allow for changes 
over time. 
 
On  the  minus  side,  the  existence  of  a  budgetary  bias  is  a  case  in  point:  in 
situations  of  doubt  as  to  the  most  efficient  spectrum  management  regime, 
budgetary considerations will have assignment methods providing the maximum 
income  for the  government  budget  prevail.  Governments  have  often  clashed 
with regulators as the consideration of cash-strapped budgets has overwhelmed 















































It is too early to provide a fact-based assessment of each of the nine spectrum 
regimes presented. It is also true that most agencies in charge of spectrum, even 
those advocating a strong market-orientation like OFCOM or the FCC, tend to 
adopt a careful and progressive approach to changes in management methods; 
the  road  to  a  competitive  spectrum  market  is  more  evolutionary  than 
revolutionary.  The  specifications  and  restrictions  attached  to  the  frequency 
usage plan are progressively softened or lifted, and possibly changed into an 
orientation framework. In this sense, the variety of spectrum regimes presented 
in  this  paper  can  provide  a  map  on  which  an  evolutionary  path  from  one 
spectrum  regime  to  another may  be  traced,  alongside  evolutions  in  wireless 
technologies and spectrum usage. The actual implementation of cognitive radio, 
dynamic  frequency  selection,  for  instance,  could  warrant  an  extension  of 
easements over time. 
 
Given  the  strong  interaction  of  decisions  on  frequency  bands,  service 
applications,  and  technology  assessments,  which  constitutes  the  basic 
foundation of the choice of a spectrum management regime, it is advisable to 
operate those choices for relevant sets of bands, services, and technology areas, 
which  we  call  wireless  clusters.  Such  clusters  would  include,  for  instance, 
mobile voice and television, fixed wireless access, professional mobile radio, 
collective  use,  public  safety,  etc.
13  From  this  perspective,  there  might  be 
migrations  over  time  from  one  spectrum  regime  to  another,  to  implement 
changes required by demonstrated positive technological changes. Instead of a 
war of doctrines between command and control, market and commons, we could 
have, when required for a cluster of wireless services, an evolutionary process 
over time between progressive spectrum regimes. 
 
It should be remembered throughout this evolutionary process, however, that 
like at a higher level of policy consideration, efficiency lies in tough choices. If 
we look at the  strongest performing economies over the last 50 years, good 
performances have been achieved by market economies like the U.S. and UK on 
the one hand, as well as co-ordinated social market economies like Germany, 
Japan, Ireland and the Netherlands on the other. Countries in the middle have 
performed less strongly. This may indicate that the problem lies not with market 
mechanisms, or more social models per se, but with distortions resulting from 
their application being only partial: a significant part of our present spectrum 
situation is due to the fact that part of the commercial spectrum is managed in an 
                                                   





































un-commercial way. If the broadcasting industry had been offered the possibility 
to trade (sell) its spectrum, maybe it would have found more profitable to do so 
and use the proceeds to expand its cable, satellite, and ADSL TV operation, 
instead of switching from analogue to digital on terrestrial. 
 
 
Legacy  and  institutional  factors  might  play  a  bigger  role  than  markets  and 
technologies, especially as the time horizon and gradient are superior to that 
usually encountered in business and industry. How can you have trading, or 
auctions for that matter, if this is an anathema to powerful and vocal players? 
What could then be a second-best approach if market-induced flexibility cannot 
be extended right across the EU? One first element of an answer is easements, 
sharing, collective use, and dynamic access. Some sharing will have to take 
place due to the expected limitations of spectrum available for IMT and beyond. 
Furthermore, new technologies will help bridge the gap between static (short-
term) and dynamic (long-term) efficiency as embedded in the standardisation 
versus  non-standardisation  dilemma.  They  substitute  families  of  contiguous 
technologies  to  single  technologies  at  any  single  time.  They  also  facilitate 
smooth  evolutionary  transitions  over  time,  enabling  dynamic  efficiency,  and 
lifting the curse of necessary disruptions between discrete standards. The same 
evolutionary vision could apply to spectrum management regimes. 
h
a
l
-
0
0
2
6
9
8
8
8
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
3
 
A
p
r
 
2
0
0
8